


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USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 3, March 1990

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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology

No 3, March 1990

United States in World High-Technology Complex

904K0007A Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 20 Feb 90) pp 3-12

[Article by Aleksandr Romanovich Daniyelov, candidate of economic sciences and scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] One of the most significant and, according to many American researchers, most dramatic developments of the 1980's in the U.S. economy was the unprecedented vigor with which foreign competitors began crowding national producers out of the domestic market for high-technology goods (not to mention the world market). Foreign and Soviet economic studies frequently note that America is losing its past superiority in the field of advanced industrial production and in scientific and technical progress in general. The reason is that the other developed capitalist countries, especially Japan and the West European states, and some of the "new industrial nations" seized the initiative from the United States in the second half of the 1970's and in the 1980's and began producing the highly competitive and technically progressive consumer goods that still determine the degree of involvement of national economies in the scientific-technical revolution. There are also many statements to the effect that the highly dynamic Japanese economy has now taken first place among the developed states, pushing the United States into second place. Some futurologists predict that Japan, and not the United States, will be the leader in world scientific and technical progress in the near future, if it has not already become the leader.

How valid are these comments?

Victories of Foreign Producers

The massive restructuring of industrial production in Japan and the leading capitalist countries of Europe which was launched in the second half of the 1970's was supposed to maximize the efficiency of technology through the widespread computerization of the main production equipment and control systems. The emphasis was shifted to the maximum conservation of energy and the reduction of the labor-intensiveness of technological operations. The strategic purpose of this restructuring was the need to produce high-quality manufactured goods, especially those contributing to scientific and technical progress and to more profitable and efficient operational procedures. There was a simultaneous emphasis on enhancing the competitive potential of products in relation to their American counterparts primarily by reducing overhead costs and by achieving some superiority in quality. Because of the broader and

more intense international transfers of technologies and their "diffusion" in the internationalized capitalist economy, the United States could not remain the unquestioned leader for long in the industrial incorporation of many high-technology goods, most of which were first developed in the United States itself. Because of the high level of automation in technological processes, the development of progressive production was not confined to the territory of the United States after the factor of labor skills lost its importance, and production of this kind began to be carried out with exceptional efficiency in some of the "Third World" countries.

The fact that the restructuring of industry in the United States began at the turn of the decade, slightly later than in the countries of its competitors, allowed the latter to win perceptible victories over America in the markets for electronic equipment, machine tools, motor vehicles, the products of fine chemical technologies, etc. The research base in Japan and the West European countries was reinforced perceptibly. In addition to this, the improvement of production management led to the quicker augmentation of labor productivity in some of these countries than in the United States (Table 1). In general, the relative indicators of economic development, especially indicators of the degree of involvement in the scientific-technical revolution, were higher in the countries competing with the United States. In Japan, for example, research expenditures represented 3.2 percent of the GNP by the beginning of the 1990's, as compared to 2.8 percent in the United States.

Table 1. Dynamics of Labor Productivity in Some Developed Capitalist Countries, % (1977 = 100%)

Year	United States	Japan	FRG	France
1970	80.8	64.8	71.2	70.0
1980	101.4	122.7	108.6	110.6
1985	124.2	161.1	128.5	133.3
1987	132.4	170.5	132.4	141.2

Source: "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1989," p 831.

The growing competition of foreign research centers in basic research in solid-state physics, chemical analysis, biochemistry, genetic engineering, and other fields of knowledge in which American science had previously never encountered any competition, became a serious area of concern for American experts. Foreign researchers have almost surpassed the design laboratories of U.S. firms in applied industrial R & D, and they have already surpassed them in some fields (for example, in electrical engineering and household electronics, automotive engineering, machine tool production, and robot engineering). American economists have commented on the inflexibility of national producers and on their unsatisfactory use of positive managerial experience and the most efficient technology used in the enterprises of leading foreign firms, which has resulted in "one-way" transfers of technology—i.e., primarily from the United

States. The Japanese firms specializing in high-technology production have established close contact with American "suppliers" of new technical designs, such as universities, independent research laboratories, and the "ventures" which take the risk of incorporating non-traditional technologies, but there are virtually no examples of the opposite. In particular, in 1987 Japanese corporations acquired 20 times as many American electronics and general engineering firms as U.S. corporations in Japan. Foreign companies producing high-technology goods are opening enterprises all over the United States and are establishing consortiums in which American capital's share is far from dominant. Japanese and West European companies are already establishing production units in the United States not requiring skilled labor, such as, for example, Nippon Electric, the world leader in the semiconductor market.¹

Given the present situation in the field of scientific research, there has been a dramatic increase in the interaction of American and Japanese research teams in R & D projects in advanced fields of technical development, whereas U.S. industry had relied primarily on the results of domestic R & D right up to the end of the 1970's. Even in the holy of holies of American industry, the defense sector, the influence of foreign R & D projects is growing. In fiscal year 1988 the Reagan administration had to reconsider a bill raising the percentage of the military R & D results obtained in foreign laboratories from 30 to 67 percent of the total results used in national defense production (calculated in terms of the cost of total expenditures on military-technical research).²

The victories of foreign competitors have been particularly perceptible in the mass production of high-technology goods. The high cost of labor in the United States is not the only reason that American firms cannot compete with foreign goods. The functional disparities in the structure of American industrial R & D are another significant reason: Almost four-fifths of all expenditures are used to finance the development of new goods and the improvement of existing ones, and only one-fifth is used to optimize the technological conditions of production. Foreign corporations invest large sums in the development of highly efficient and waste-free technologies. As a result of this, foreign goods are often 20-25 percent cheaper than their American counterparts.

The loss of U.S. preeminence in the market for electronic and microelectronic components has already been acknowledged. By the end of the 1980's, Japanese exports of electronic equipment, estimated at 65 billion dollars, exceeded imports eight-fold. The United States, on the other hand, became the largest net importer of electronics, particularly progressive materials for the electronics industry, computerized control systems for technological equipment, computers themselves, telecommunications systems, etc. In the last 10 years Japan's share of world semiconductor production has almost doubled, reaching 49 percent, while the U.S. share has decreased from 55 to 39 percent. Japanese

companies now control almost 90 percent of the world market for the latest generation of memory-enhancement semiconductors—the 1-megabyte DRAMS chips.

Japanese producers have also surpassed the Americans in the production of automation equipment, which is the main indication of future high-technology trends. The United States did not encounter any serious competition in this market until the middle of the 1980's. Because of the increasing significance of the flexible automation of mass production, the position in the market for flexible computerized manufacturing systems and the degree of their use in industry are employed as indicators of the technological priority of a country. Until recently, most of these systems were concentrated in U.S. industry (more than 70 units, or around 35 percent), but by 1990 over 40 percent of all the systems installed in the capitalist countries were already concentrated in Japan. In addition to purely quantitative indicators, there are the data suggesting that these systems are used more efficiently in Japanese corporations than in American ones, and that the Japanese systems themselves are more advanced in the technical sense. The Japanese systems are operating at 82 percent of projected capacity, for example, whereas the figure for the American systems is only 52 percent. In the first case the period of incorporation is half as long as in the second.³ On the average, the Japanese systems can manufacture up to 93 different parts simultaneously, whereas the Americans cannot produce more than 10. Furthermore, experience has shown that not one of the U.S. systems can work without a night-time operator (because of malfunctions), whereas 18 systems at Japanese enterprises are operating with no human control whatsoever. Japanese systems also take less time to install. In Japan the final adjustments are made in under 2 years, whereas in the United States the installation and adjustment process takes from 2.5 to 3 years. All automation equipment is used more efficiently at Japanese enterprises because businessmen invest capital not only in the acquisition of this equipment, but also in the development of more efficiently interacting and operating systems. A few years ago, only 5 percent of the American metalworking enterprises with flexible systems or elements of these systems were using them to maximum advantage.⁴

The robots and mechanical arms which were first incorporated in U.S. industry as an exceptionally important element of automation were also being used on the broadest scale in Japanese firms by the beginning of the 1990's. Whereas only 25,000 pieces of this equipment were installed in U.S. industry in 1987 (only twice as many as in, for example, the FRG), the figure in Japan was 118,800. The United States is also lagging behind other developed capitalist countries noticeably in the level of robot engineering in industry (in terms of the number of robots per 100 employees). Japan is also becoming the world leader in the production of industrial robots. The average pre-sale cost of the American hydraulic drive robot weighing up to 4,000 pounds

ranges from 30,000 to 200,000 dollars, whereas the Japanese robot of this category costs from 5,000 to 40,000 dollars. It is understandable that foreign robots exceeded 80 percent of the industrial robots used in U.S. industry in the second half of the 1980's and that almost 80 percent of the imported robots were Japanese.⁵

The production of machine tools with numerical control is still categorized as a high-technology sector of industry. The United States is losing its leadership in this field as well. By the middle of the 1980's machines tools with numerical control represented only 40 percent of all the machine tools produced by American firms, while the figure was 67 percent in Japanese companies. The U.S. share of world machine tool production decreased from 40 to 12 percent between 1955 and 1985, whereas Japan's share increased from 1 to 24 percent. During the 1980's the United States suffered from a chronic deficit in foreign trade in machine tools; the main exporters of these tools to the United States were Japan (48 percent of American imports), the FRG (17 percent), Italy (8 percent), Switzerland (6 percent), and Taiwan (5 percent). In May 1986 the Reagan administration concluded "voluntary restriction agreements" with the main exporters for a freeze on annual exports to the United States in the next 5 years. The agreements cover shipments of machining centers, lathes with and without numerical control, metal-cutting tools with and without numerical control, and some equipment for the primary processing of metals after smelting. During this period, according to the administration's plans, research assistance to the American producer of machine tools was to enhance the competitiveness of his products (over 5 million dollars from the federal budget was to be allocated for this purpose in the first 3 years).⁶

There are many such examples of the United States' loss of leadership in high-technology branches of industry. The result is a clear reduction of the country's share of world exports of high-technology goods in the 1980's (Table 2). American researchers have called this tendency extremely alarming, viewing it as something just short of the "decline and fall of high-technology America." After analyzing the degree to which foreign competitors had infiltrated the high-technology market in the United States, prominent economist C. Ferguson, one of the main researchers at the MIT Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development, issued the impassioned warning that "the United States must realize that the development of high technology and the policies of Japan in this area, and not Soviet warheads, will pose a threat to U.S. national security in the future."⁷ Even with a view to the inclination of the American economic and commercial press to overdramatize assessments of the state of the national economy, the loss of influence by

American firms in the world markets for some high-technology goods is certainly indisputable.

Table 2. U.S. Share of World Exports of Products of the Main, Primarily High-Technology Industries, %

Branches	1980	1983	1985	1986	1987
General engineering	21.4	22.2	21.4	18.3	17.2
Vehicle production	18.3	17.6	18.7	15.7	15.5
Chemical industry	17.9	18.3	17.9	15.5	15.3
Other basic branches of processing industry	10.1	8.9	7.9	6.8	6.9

Source: "Statistical Abstract of the United States 1989," p 731.

"Decline" or Re-specialization?

These examples might attest to the vulnerability of the U.S. position in the world high-technology complex, but we can also investigate other matters than come up during analysis: In which fields of high technology is the United States losing influence? What steps are American producers taking to regain their earlier superiority in the high-technology market? Finally, how advanced, from the standpoint of the global scientific-technical revolution, are the fields of production in which the United States has encountered the strongest competition?

In spite of the exceptional importance which has been assigned and is still being assigned to the development of electronics, the present functioning of electronic systems, which have already become traditional to some extent, is more likely to define the present state of the scientific-technical revolution than to symbolize its future. The degree to which other countries have surpassed the United States in the development of electronic equipment and the technology of its production is already an indicator of past accomplishments from the standpoint of scientific investigation. Further investigations in electronics will lead to fundamentally new frontiers in the assessment of its role. As the new millennium approaches, the outlines of a new technological method of production will become distinct and will make modern automation equipment (flexible computerized manufacturing systems, robots, machining centers, and the present types of industrial computers) archaic. We are already witnessing the reassessment of the values industry created 5 or 7 years ago and is still creating, and a perceptible change in public demand. Microwave ovens are replacing the gas and electric stoves that are still being produced, digital video and audio recordings are crowding analog equipment out of the market, and optical fiber has proved to be superior to the traditional metal cable. The modernization of customary work equipment and technological procedures

(for example, the machining of complex parts on precision tools with numerical programming or the proliferation of electronic transmitters and convertor computers) can only serve as a way of **improving** equipment and technology, whereas priority is now being assigned to the development and incorporation of **high-quality products of the next generation**.

The fundamentally new items include a broad range of machines, materials, and production units which now exist only in experimental laboratories and in the initial stages of industrial incorporation (especially in biotechnology, including projects in the development of "protein" computers, the development of fiber optics in electronics, the expanded use of lasers, the production of spacecraft and space communications systems, the conservation of energy and the use of new sources of energy, the development of progressive composite materials, the development of electronic printing, etc.).

In spite of the quicker growth of research potential in Japan and the West European countries than in the United States, the latter's potential is almost equal to the potential of the first two in absolute terms. It is a commonly acknowledged fact that capital input per scientist, designer, and worker in the United States is higher than the indicator in, for example, Japan. In spite of the rapid growth of labor productivity in Japanese industry, productivity itself is still not equivalent to any more than 70-75 percent of the U.S. indicator. In this case, the "multiplication effect" takes hold: Although the relative rise in the indicator (of labor productivity) is lower, the absolute indicator is still higher in the United States than in Japan.

The clear priority of basic research in the natural sciences over applied industrial development projects in the United States has allowed this country to retain its scientific and technical leadership. American businessmen have more impressive financial potential than their foreign competitors and invest large sums in long-range research projects in possible fields of scientific and technical evolution—i.e., in modeling tomorrow's science and technology. The well-known American IBM corporation, for example, has allocated 13 billion dollars for a mid-range program to research the most advanced fields in the development of electronics in general, whereas the corporation's annual expenditures on current R & D projects amounted to only 3.9 billion dollars in the second half of the 1980's.⁸ There are many such examples of this scientific and technical policy in American firms. Furthermore, the private sector receives considerable assistance from the government—from tax incentives to cooperative projects with federal research centers and direct subsidies. If we take a look at the most advanced fields of production, the development of which will define the future of science and technology, the international preeminence of the United States in these fields seems self-evident.

American firms are the world leaders in the development and production of progressive materials and biotechnology in general. After IBM researchers discovered high-temperature superconductivity in 1986, most of the superconductor projects were taken over by the American Carnegie Institute and Johns Hopkins University. The production of this major component of 21st-century industry has almost been monopolized by two corporations—Westinghouse Electric and General Electric (and the production of superconductive film coatings for silicon chips to increase the speed of computers has been completely monopolized). Japanese companies, on the other hand, are just beginning to investigate the possibilities of bringing U.S.-developed technologies in line with the conditions of assembly-line production. In response to the creation of the National Commission on Superconductivity in the United States in 1988, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry formed a committee of advisers on this matter, including experts from the Toshiba and Mitsubishi companies.

American producers also occupy a firm position in the market for composite metals. The United States is the world's largest producer and consumer in the composite fiber market. Firms in Western Europe (primarily France) and Japan account for only one-third of the world market, whereas the Americans control two-thirds.⁹

The production investments of new U.S. firms working on projects in biotechnology were estimated at 4.7 billion dollars in 1988, and research expenditures were estimated at 1.4-2 billion dollars. The key areas in research funding are public health (69 percent of all expenditures), plant husbandry (13 percent), animal husbandry (8 percent), the chemical and food industries (5 percent), and other fields for the use of organic substances (5 percent). Besides this, the federal government allocates around 2.7 billion dollars a year for research in these fields, and 33 state governments allocate another 150 million dollars. The main sales markets for the products of biotechnology outside the United States are Western Europe and Japan. Biotechnology has had an increasing effect on the industrial development of the leading countries ever since biosensors were invented and began to be produced in the United States—instruments consisting of biological and electronic components. The biosensors are highly accurate at defining substances and controlling quality. The development of their production is still in the preparatory stage, but the intensive mastery of their production should be anticipated in the next 1.5-2 years. Biosensors will be used for diagnostic purposes in medicine, in pharmacology, in environmental protection, in the management of technological processes in production, and in the determination of soil, air, and water quality. According to economic forecasts, by 2000 biotechnology will become one of the main branches of industry in the United States, with an annual turnover of up to a billion dollars.¹⁰ American producers will not encounter any serious competition from abroad for the next 3 or 4 years.

After accomplishing revolutionary changes in data processing and communications, fiber optics became the object of intense study by high-technology firms. American producers are still the leaders in this field as well. The United States accounts for half of the total capitalist output of optical fibers, or around 1.5 million kilometers. In addition to constantly increasing its exports of these products (from 65 million dollars to 72 million just in 1987-1988), the United States is also constantly reducing its imports. The main importers of the American products are Great Britain, the FRG, Japan, and France.¹¹

Another major element of the data processing and communications systems of the future is satellite communication equipment. Just as space technology in general, this is a field in which American producers are in the lead. The positive balance in U.S. foreign trade in satellite communication equipment will be maintained, according to expert estimates, until the middle of the 1990's. American producers have already signed contracts for the delivery of 11 satellites to Australia, Japan, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and India.¹²

The laboratory studies of the phenomenon known as artificial intelligence have moved into the stage of industrial production. It is embodied in modern tools of labor in the form of analytical processors capable of diagnosing problems and defining optimal operating conditions. This laser-optical, sonar, and sensor equipment is being used most widely in the machine vision systems equipped with the latest models of industrial robots. Artificial intelligence is also being used in machine translations from foreign languages. The United States has monopolized the production of machines translating all of the European languages and is experiencing competition only from Japan and only in the development of Anglo-Japanese models. The government has given American producers considerable assistance in artificial intelligence research projects. Federal allocations for this purpose rose from 48.5 million dollars to 172.5 million between 1984 and 1988, and around 90 percent of the total was allocated by the U.S. Defense Department. American producers now control at least 40 percent of the market for artificial intelligence systems in Japan.

One of the most promising fields of high-technology production is computer software. The manufacture of computers themselves is already a fairly traditional and developed field. The United States now controls the world software market, accounting for more than 60 percent of all software in cost terms, and will continue to control it in the near future. In addition to the United States, the EEC countries (with a share of approximately one-third of the market) and Japan (one-fifth) operate in this market. American programmers were responsible for the most powerful and universal programs, such as Ashton-Tate's dBASE IV, Autodesk's AutoCAD, and Lotus 1-2-3. According to some data, the cost of producing software is equivalent to at least 2 percent of the U.S. GNP.¹³

The United States is the indisputable leader in several high-technology fields securing the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. They include the development of laser equipment and special precision tools, the manufacture of CAD/CAM systems, and the production of complex medical equipment. When we analyze the evolution of any high-technology field even over the short range, however, we can see that the United States will not be able to lead the world in most of these fields for long.

If we examine the nature of the production of goods which were once regarded as the most progressive high-technology items in the United States, we can see that American firms were not the world leaders for long in the overwhelming majority of cases. After being developed and produced for the first time in the United States, items which were once categorized as high-technology products (color television sets, mini- and micro-computers, industrial robots, and laser digital recording and reproducing devices) later began to be produced in other countries, including developing states, at a lower cost and with no deterioration of quality, and sometimes even with some improvement in quality. The only exceptions are aerospace engineering, the production of large computers, some high-technology subdivisions of the defense industry, and other smaller subbranches in which American corporations have retained their preeminence for several decades.

It is easy to see that at some stage in the production of high-technology goods (particularly consumer goods), American producers lose the initiative, seemingly by handing over to foreign competitors highly perfected and highly profitable technologies requiring nothing more than a few final adjustments. It appears as though the large scientific-production complexes in the United States (which is what the industrial corporations essentially are) lose interest in the product after they have developed advanced equipment and mastered its production. This is probably the reason why American producers have no plans to regain some of the positions they have lost in the world high-technology market.

Of course, it would be wrong to say that American experts have absolutely no reason to be alarmed by the foreign competition in advanced fields of science and technology. The electronics industry in the United States, for example, is making a considerable effort to restore its earlier prominence, and the prolonged supremacy in the production of large high-speed computers is the result of intense struggle by American firms. They are also striving to hold on to the initiative in the further improvement of electronic equipment. They have won some victories in this difficult struggle. The IBM corporation, for example, still controls more than 60 percent of the world electronics market, earning at least 70 percent of the total profits of electronics producers in the capitalist world. The American Rockwell International firm controls 70 percent of the market for modems for facsimile printing just in Japan. The Intel company accomplished a perceptible breakthrough in

the augmentation of computer memory in 1985 by developing the 80386 processor, which secured the birth of the new generation of IBM PC computers; this processor allows the computer to store up to 2 million standard pages of any kind of information, whereas all earlier machines "remembered" no more than 8,000 pages.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the American firms specializing in high technology are acquiring the nature of "venture" or "pioneer" scientific-production associations. By engaging in the development and initial incorporation of the most progressive and promising products, they are constantly on the cutting edge of scientific and technical progress and derive much greater economic benefit from their temporary monopoly than they would if they were to continue waging an exhausting competitive struggle for decades with foreign producers for markets for goods already incorporated in industry. The venture firm, which is the only type capable of making major breakthroughs in high-technology fields, has become common in the American economy and is used to check the efficacy of non-traditional forms and methods of production.

In conclusion, we must say that the excessively pessimistic appraisals of the United States' role and place in world high-technology production seem quite superficial. It is clear that the country has a definite field of specialization in international division of labor. Whereas the United States was the acknowledged "forge" of the capitalist world in the recent past, now it is more interested in acquiring the status of its research and design laboratory and experimental production center.

The gradual extension of "mass-scale" industry beyond national boundaries is a natural and, what is more, deliberate process. The highly developed technologies, their complete automation, allowing for the employment of even unskilled labor, and the relatively low cost of labor are the economic factors motivating the decision to locate large industrial production facilities outside the United States. The facilities businessmen choose to keep within U.S. territory are those in which the highly skilled labor of specialists is justified and, what is more, essential, and where the bases of the technological preeminence of the United States in today's world are being laid. These production facilities are the most advanced, non-traditional industrial subdivisions of limited dimensions which conduct constant experiments to find new areas of scientific and technical progress.

It is too early to say that a so-called post-industrial society exists in the United States, but it is clearly taking shape there.

Footnotes

1. FOREIGN POLICY, 1989, No 74, p 135.
2. AMERICAN MACHINIST, April 1988, p 31.

3. FOREIGN POLICY, 1989, No 74, pp 133, 135.
4. IRON AGE, 20 September 1985, p 63; AMERICAN MACHINIST, December 1986, p 17.
5. "1987 U.S. Industrial Outlook," p 21-6; TIME, 13 July 1987, p 35.
6. "1987 U.S. Industrial Outlook," pp 21-1, 21-2.
7. FOREIGN POLICY, 1989, No 74, p 142.
8. INDUSTRY WEEK, 29 September 1986, p 42; BUSINESS WEEK, 22 June 1987, p 80.
9. "1989 U.S. Industrial Outlook," pp 19-6, 19-7.
10. Ibid., p 19-3.
11. Ibid., pp 27-6, 27-7.
12. Ibid., p 27-4.
13. Ibid., p 26-3; FOREIGN POLICY, 1989, No 74, p 131.
14. FORTUNE, 13 October 1986, p 20; INDUSTRY WEEK, 29 September 1986, p 42; IRON AGE, 3 January 1986, p 21.

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Current Developments in American Political System

904K0007B Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 20 Feb 90) pp 13-20

[Article by Sergey Borisovich Komolov, third secretary in Information Administration of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The United States could hardly be categorized as one of the countries distinguished by highly acute inter-party rivalry. The main American parties, the Democratic and Republican parties, are loose decentralized coalitions; American politics is coalitionary by its very nature. In view of this, it is surprising that both of these parties and the two-party system itself do not seem to have undergone any changes since the middle of the last century, but this is a misleading assumption. In reality, there is an extremely vigorous dynamic, which American experts keep under close scrutiny. There are some Soviet academic histories and political analyses of the party system in the United States.¹ The author of this article will attempt to take an institutional-functional approach to the topic—i.e., an approach based solely on political analysis—and to derive some general conclusions. This subject matter is more universal than specifically American. It is relevant for all societies wanting to live in an atmosphere of stable democracy.

General Tendencies in the Development of the U.S. Party System

American political scientists have three basic views on trends in the development of the U.S. party system. Some feel that **the present party system is constantly degenerating and will eventually disappear** and that the American people are losing interest in the idea of political parties as such. This is the opinion of such prominent experts as W. Burnham, D. Broder, and (with a few reservations, which seem significant to us) E. Ladd. The latter asks the following question: "Is party membership in our century associated with a departure from the parties or with some kind of psychological imperative? Has it not lost most of its meaning...and become nothing more than a reflection of current political preferences?"²

Ladd feels that these tendencies stem from the alienation of the highly educated electorate from stable party ties under the influence of the news media and its reorientation toward the personalities of individual politicians, and from the inability of most voters to identify themselves completely with a single party because of the ambivalence of their own views on major political issues.

The relationship between the two leading American parties and the electorate warrants special consideration. Interesting tendencies can be seen here. On the one hand, it was not that long ago, at the beginning of the 1980's, that it was popular to talk about America's rightward shift and about the waning appeal of "liberal Democratic" policies and the dramatically increased influence of the "conservative Republicans." Of course, at some point the far Right did form an alliance with the Republican Party and seized the political initiative from the Democrats with their outdated slogans (although they retained control of the House of Representatives and most of the elected offices in the states even then). This, however, did not last long. Reagan had already stopped trying to please the conservative extremists in 1986-1988. In the 1988 election campaign, the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates expressed similar views, which could probably be called moderate. What happened?

Apparently, the researchers who believed that most of the American electorate had turned conservative and that this electorate had been polarized along liberal and conservative lines were mistaken. Public opinion polls testify that the ideological orientation of voters underwent constant erosion. This was accompanied by the equal lessening of their emotional attachment to a particular party as the hub of liberal or conservative values. Today most Americans cannot be called liberal or conservative. They have become strictly pragmatic and have begun basing their votes not on party affiliations, but on the credibility of the candidate and on the results of the performance of his predecessor. The main question in contemporary American politics, according to Ladd, is the following: "How successfully is the country securing

its prosperity, and which candidate (or party) seems more capable of adding to this prosperity in the next 4 years?"³

According to the second group of experts, **the American party system has entered a period of massive regrouping and a change of forms** or is at least preparing for this kind of regrouping. In their opinion, the party system of the Roosevelt "New Deal" days (with the Democrats representing the liberal party of the coalitionary majority and the Republicans representing the conservative party of a homogeneous minority) has come to an end. The main supporters of this theory are V. Kay, K. Phillips, and D. Truman. They do not agree, however, on what will replace the present party system. Phillips feels that the natural party of the majority should be the Republican Party in view of the protracted tendency toward the revival of conservatism in the American society. Truman sees the regrouping as something different, viewing it from the institutional standpoint as a move toward new party structures and the elimination of the old party machines. In his opinion, "the functional basis for the developing new party structure will probably be a permanent organization for the management of election campaigns, capable of choosing, preparing, and directing candidates for elections to the House of Representatives and the Senate, and supplementing, rather than competing with, the organization managing presidential campaigns."⁴

Finally, a third group believes that **essentially no regrouping will take place and that the party system of the New Deal era will retain its influence with a few minor internal adjustments**. This is the point of view of, for example, J. Sundquist and R. Goldman.⁵ The advocates of this point of view have conflicting ideas about the purported decline of the parties: On the one hand, they acknowledge the long-term tendency toward the disintegration of today's parties, but on the other they feel that their influence could be restored over the short range. Although Sundquist defends the viability of the party system of the New Deal years, he does admit that the "broad-based American parties have always included diverse, incompatible, and even hostile elements and have always had to live in a state of internal compromise."⁶ In other words, he confirms the fragmentation of the mass base of the American political parties, which is an important part of the theory of the decline of the parties.

None of these political scientists questions the strength of the "legal-governmental" positions of the Democratic and Republican parties or the degree of their integration into the machinery of state. They are speaking of tendencies in the evolution of the two-party system itself—long-range and short-range, weak and strong, interacting and separate.

What conclusion can we draw from this? The stabilizing effects of the modernization of the party political structure are indisputable. The decline of the present party system can be interpreted in different ways. Oddly

enough, even this tendency is positive from the standpoint of the interests of the American society, and even such an extreme form of disinterest in politics as voter apathy ultimately promotes the stability of the political process. After all, in this case the ballots are cast by the most informed and most aware voters with more or less stable political views.

Even the most critical attitude of the voters toward political institutions and their constant fault-finding cannot produce the desired stabilizing effects, however, if there is no machinery for reaching a fundamental consensus in the society and achieving the willingness of various political forces to work together. It is precisely the function of the political parties to secure this consensus in American views.

Culture and Ethics of Intra-Party and Inter-Party Compromise as a Function of the Electoral Process

Many researchers regard the influence of the electoral process—the effects of election results on the evolution of the party system—as the key factor. In any case, regular competitive elections have a strong formative effect on the political culture of society and keep parties from becoming self-contained entities by promoting a constant search for compromises. The American voter is most likely to “penalize” the candidate who appears to be intractable and egotistical in the pursuit of his own narrow goals.

There is the opinion, presented in works by sociologists and corroborated by experience, that the “Western” ethical model differs fundamentally from the “Eastern” one because of its emphasis on compromise. The very concept of sacrifice in the West presupposes the renunciation of certain demands and even certain interests for the sake of a mutually acceptable result, whereas in the East sacrifice takes the form of heroic self-denial for the sake of total victory over “the wrong side.”

From the standpoint of the moral and psychological premises of the political process, the prevailing ethical model is of the greatest importance. By the same token, the culture of compromise in politics is itself a function of the democratic process—i.e., primarily a function of free elections. The virtually continuous election campaigns in the United States, combined with the all-encompassing machinery of public information, will not allow political extremism to seize total control. The political pendulum cannot stay in one place for long.

The results of recent elections have forced American politicians to search constantly for compromises. The present situation is one in which a representative of the Republican Party is elected president and Democrats are awarded the majority in Congress and in local legislatures and most of the gubernatorial offices in the states. Professor D. Horowitz has commented that 54 percent of the Americans polled in 1984 said they preferred a situation in which no one party controls the presidency and both houses of Congress simultaneously, while 39 percent were opposed to this situation. “The public is

firmly committed to the separation of powers and the interdepartmental and inter-party system of checks and balances.”⁷ Of course, not everyone appreciates this kind of two-link system. Political scientist T. Patterson, for example, feels that it impedes the normal functioning of democracy.⁸

The decreasing autonomy of party mechanisms, the “nationalization” (the increasing significance of the national level) of party politics, and the stronger emphasis on a consensus in American politics led to the erosion of party discipline in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Legislators, not to mention rank-and-file party functionaries, are less and less inclined to submit to the wishes of their parliamentary leaders (and even the President at times) and to party decisions. At the height of Republican R. Reagan’s popularity, for instance, a whole group of Democratic congressmen voted for the measures he proposed even when these measures were contrary to the basic Democratic party line. At the beginning of the Bush presidency, on the other hand, some Republican senators did not agree to support the nomination of J. Tower as secretary of defense even though this was of the greatest importance to Bush. Several other examples could be cited. The concept of party discipline has been completely obscured by the need to maintain the kind of intra-party consensus without which election victory is impossible.

The positive aspects of this tendency are self-evident: As many political scientists believe, a broad internal political consensus had taken shape in the United States by the end of the 1980’s, and within this consensus there are no real disagreements between the Democratic and Republican parties. As political scientists M. Barone and G. Ujifusa commented, “it is clear that politics no longer consists in the defense of different policy lines by different parties. The parties are more likely to compete with one another in identifying themselves as closely as possible with the same set of ideas.”⁹

Effects of Recent Federal Elections on the Evolution of U.S. Political Parties

All researchers agree that the presidential and congressional elections in 1980, 1984, and 1988 were milestones in contemporary U.S. political history and provided the momentum for several structural processes in the American political system, but they interpret the significance of these events in different ways.

The results of the latest elections are used most actively to prove their own theories by the people who are convinced of the inevitability of regrouping within the party system in the Republicans’ favor. For example, K. Phillips, T. Edsall, and others justifiably point out the stable increase in the number of registered Democrats voting for Republican presidential candidates and the perceptible growth of the Republican Party’s appeal to Americans under the age of 30 and assert that the “Reagan coalition” has become a long-term factor.

Recent election results, however, also corroborate the views of those who believe that the party system of the New Deal era will retain its basic features. Sundquist, for example, points out the fact that the "Reagan majority" took shape as a result of the unification of the traditional "economic" and "socio-religious" (also known as the "New Right") conservatives. The concerns of the New Right (compulsory prayer in the schools, a ban on abortions, etc.) are not of fundamental importance to the traditional conservatives. When it turned out that the majority of New Right demands could not be satisfied for constitutional or political reasons, the coalition fell apart. As Sundquist says in reference to the issues raised by the "Reagan coalition": "Taken together they might seem important enough at times to dominate political debates—one of the necessary qualities of the regrouping factor—but not with the simplicity and clarity needed for the polarization of society, which is another essential condition for regrouping."¹⁰ Furthermore, Sundquist remarks, the 1980 elections "clearly focused attention for the first time in many years on the fundamental conflict over domestic economic issues which served as the justification for the New Deal party system for almost half a century."¹¹ The subsequent struggle over economic and financial policy reinforced the traditional watershed between the two main parties (in fact, according to 1988 surveys, 41 percent of the voters identified themselves as Democrats and 31 percent as Republicans,¹² which is approximately equal to the situation in 1981).

Election results are used cogently to substantiate the theories of researchers predicting the decline of the parties. Ladd stresses that "there is an ever increasing number of Americans categorizing themselves as independents, basing voting decisions on the candidates' personalities and on election issues instead of supporting a party ticket."

Of course, all of this provides objective evidence of the parties' loss of their stable influence on the voters and, consequently, of their autonomous political role.

Incidentally, Ladd does not completely deny the possibility of the realignment of the party system on the level of the electorate, but he does not assign universal significance to this thesis. Significant changes, he says, have taken place within the party system and can give rise to realignment. There have been changes in the attitudes of large groups of voters. It is also impossible to deny the fact that the Republicans have become the party of the stable presidential majority. All of these processes are equivocal but real. We must remember, however, that they are taking place at a time of the continued abandonment of the political parties by voters and a loss of interest in the very institution of the party.

This kind of balanced view, taking the diverse and sometimes conflicting tendencies into account, is the most accurate assessment of the current state of affairs. This has been corroborated by recent events. The presidential campaign of 1988 proved that Americans entered

into it without showing preference for any party in advance. The voters were inclined to support the Democrats at first, and then the unsuccessful campaign of M. Dukakis reduced the Democrats' chances, but without keeping them from strengthening their position in the Congress. The 1988 elections took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented apathy: Only 50 percent of the voters cast ballots (the lowest figure since 1924). It is completely obvious that the Americans are less and less likely to get excited about party politics.

Consequences of Internal Reforms in the Main Political Parties

When processes within the party system on the institutional level are being analyzed, exceptional importance is assigned to the reforms of the 1970's and 1980's, which mainly changed the appearance of the Democratic Party but were then adopted by the Republicans as well. This is a natural tendency in the functioning of the two-party mechanism.

The McGovern-Fraser Commission the Democrats set up paved the way for the establishment of direct primary elections throughout the country for the nomination of candidates to elected office. Other changes were effected by the party procedures and rules the Democrats adopted in 1974 and by the subsequent improvement of these procedures. According to D. Truman, these changes virtually destroyed the old party machines in the states and "essentially eliminated the representative method of nominating presidential candidates, replacing it with an amorphous system of participation from which the official party organizations in the states and their leaders were effectively excluded."¹³ Of course, this does not mean that the control of the electoral process was transferred from professional party politicians directly to the voters. As American political scientists have pointed out, what occurred was a redistribution of power within the party establishment. The structure of the political process changed, but it was still controlled by professional politicians. As G. Weckin remarked, "the transformation the Democratic Party underwent in the 1970's made the national organization stronger than the traditionally independent state and local organizations."¹⁴

There is some indication that this "nationalization" of American party activity worked to the benefit, and certainly not to the detriment, of the stability of the political system as a whole. The elimination of the power of local party bosses and the simultaneous modernization of the party structure were most consistent with the present tendencies in the development of the American society. It is significant that this was not a matter of traditional centralization, but precisely of "nationalization," which could not injure the decentralized, coalitionary nature of the American parties. National politics moved out of the "smoke-filled rooms" where deals had been made in the past to an open nationwide arena, in

which interested party members in any part of the country could influence the outcome of the political struggle.

The intra-party reforms of the 1970's and 1980's had fairly conflicting results. On the one hand, they created the objective conditions for the elevation of party mechanisms to a qualitatively new and essentially European level (signifying the reinforcement and centralization of the party system). On the other, they also had a destructive and disorganizing impact, and this became the dominant tendency in time. The old party machines are gradually disappearing, but new structures have not taken their place yet. Apparently, at this time the Americans are most comfortable with the status quo.

New Development: Parties in Competition with Non-Party Organizations

Although the idea of the decline of the political parties in the United States has been disputed, some indications of the diminishing role of the parties seem indisputable. The main one is the constantly decreasing share of campaign financing provided by official party organizations (especially their national committees). To win an election, a candidate must collect large sums of money for his "war chest." Because the candidates' own parties are incapable of providing substantial assistance in this area, the candidate (particularly in presidential and Senate elections) forms his own organization of supporters, a "committee for the election of," officially operating within the party framework but not entering into any official party structures. The contributions of official party organizations represent only 10-15 percent of the expenditures of these committees. Financial participation by the parties was reduced by the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act, and this status was then reinforced by law: The organizations' contributions to the campaign funds of individual candidates are limited to 5,000 dollars.

The vacuum created by the reduction of the parties' political and financial influence could not last long and was soon filled by the dramatically increased influence of non-party political organizations—the so-called political action committees (PAC's). They are of two different types: the independent committees formed by corporations, labor unions, and other "parent" organizations, and the ideological PAC's (supporting the candidate's platform rather than his personality), which represent 22-23 percent of the total. The perceptible growth of the influence of independent PAC's in the 1980's was connected largely with the growth of the New Right movement, which did not have enough trust in the Republican Party to act only within the bounds of its structures. The committees spend the funds they collect in two ways: by contributing them to candidates or by conducting independent campaigns for certain candidates.

Until recently, the number of PAC's increased rapidly, from 608 in 1974 to around 4,000 by the end of the 1980's. Their campaign expenditures increased from

12.5 million dollars in 1974 to around 190 million in 1988 (with around 30 million spent on independent campaigns).¹⁵

Some researchers (F. Sorauf, for example) have noted with some alarm that the parties and political action committees occupy clearly unequal positions. Whereas the parties are controlled by the voters and have to be guided by certain rules of play so that they will not lose access to power, the committees bear no responsibility for the content of their campaigns because they do not nominate candidates and do not suffer election defeats. Furthermore, whereas the parties are bound by legal restrictions on campaign financing, there are no restrictions on the "independent" expenditures of the committees yet. The "ideological" committees can spend as much as they want to ruin the reputation of candidates they do not like while staying in the background and beyond control.

Whereas the PAC's have become part of "big politics," several organizations with the characteristics of informal movements (such as the Campaign for a Nuclear Freeze, the Sierra Club, and others) are not active in the organization and financing of campaigns. They influence the political "agenda" mainly by putting up ideological competition. As a result, the party leaders frequently adopt their slogans (especially in the case of ecological movements).

Therefore, the party system in the United States is still quite stable, follows its own rules of order, and is performing its assigned functions. It is maintaining a balance in civic affairs, providing an outlet for various grievances, allowing interested citizens to participate in politics, and fitting in harmoniously with current socioeconomic and political conditions in the United States.

The past experience of the American parties indicates that during periods when crucial decisions of the utmost importance must be made, decentralization and maximum internal autonomy are indisputable factors of the stability of the system. The party system has been supplemented by a system of informal political organizations with which the parties can ally themselves without losing their own distinctive features. The parties can use the non-party committees to achieve and retain power (as the Republican Party has done so successfully).

What kind of lessons can Soviet politicians and political analysts learn from this? Above all, that the presence of conflicting platforms within parties is nothing to fear. It is an indication of strength and viability rather than of weakness.

The crux of the matter is the mechanism for achieving a consensus, the culture of compromise. This mechanism cannot take shape without the institutionalization of political forces representing various interests. Otherwise, some interests will invariably be ignored when important decisions are made, and this will have a destabilizing effect.

Footnotes

1. See, for example, "Politicheskiye partii SShA v noveysheye vremya" [Contemporary History of U.S. Political Parties], edited by N.V. Sivachev, Moscow, 1982; A.S. Manykin, "Istoriya dvukhpartiyonoy sistemy SShA" [History of the Two-Party System in the United States], Moscow, 1981; V.O. Pechatnov, "The Two-Party System and Elections," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 9; "Some New Trends in the Functioning of the Two-Party System in the 1970's and Early 1980's," PROBLEMY AMERIKANISTIKI, No 2, Moscow, 1983; "Printsipy funktsionirovaniya dvukhpartiyonoy sistemy SShA: istoriya i sovremennyye tendentsii" [Principles of the Functioning of the Two-Party System in the United States: History and Current Trends], pt 1, Moscow, 1988.
2. E. Ladd, "On Mandates, Realignment and the 1984 Presidential Election," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Spring 1985, p 22.
3. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 3 June 1988.
4. D. Truman, "Party Reform, Party Atrophy and Constitutional Change: Some Reflections," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Winter 1984/85, p 653.
5. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1989, No 4.
6. J. Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?—Revisited," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Winter 1983/84, p 585.
7. DIALOGUE, 1988, No 3(81), p 37.
8. USA TODAY, 8 November 1988.
9. DIALOGUE, 1988, No 3(81), p 35.
10. J. Sundquist, Op. cit., p 591.
11. Ibid., p 578.
12. TIME, 7 November 1988, p 26.
13. D. Truman, Op. cit., p 638.
14. G. Wekkin, "National-State Party Relations: The Democrats' New Federal Structure," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Spring 1984, p 45.
15. Calculated according to data in: USA TODAY, 28 June 1989; F. Sorauf, "Who's in Charge? Accountability in Political Action Committees," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Winter 1984/85, pp 593, 594.

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DISCUSSIONS

Future of Europe (Conclusions)

Reform of Warsaw Pact Organization Advocated

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[Article by Mikhail Yevgenyevich Bezrukov, scientific worker at the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute and Andrey Vadimovich Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences, acting section head at the same institute: "Reform of the Warsaw Pact Organization Is Needed"]

[Text] Throughout a long period of world history, East Europe has been an arena of constant crises and conflicts and an object of acute diplomatic debates. After the end of World War II, peace came to East Europe. A line was drawn under the numerous historical controversies and resentments, boundaries were specified, and bilateral and multilateral treaties were signed regulating the relationships both between the East European countries themselves and between the entire region and the rest of the world.

However, no genuine stability could be achieved in East Europe. Many conflicts, controversies, problems, and historical disputes have not been resolved; instead, they have been driven inside and declared nonexistent, by virtue of "more important considerations."

Today, when the cold war is surrendering its positions step by step, the level of military tension is going down literally before our eyes, and revolutionary changes are under way in the Soviet Union, the postwar system of international relations in East Europe is also falling apart.

That the East European states have entered a phase of social tension and economic difficulties is clear to all. That they are on the threshold of profound political changes is also quite obvious. However, what choice will be made? In what way will the subsequent course of events influence international relations? As yet, it is difficult to give an answer to these questions. There are too many unknowns in the East European political formula.

In the course of the postwar history of East Europe, the external factors of its development (including those factors which manifest themselves through the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact Organization) sometimes proved to be more significant at times than internal factors. They were able to totally invalidate the processes taking place inside one country or another, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Even when no direct intervention occurred, the very notions of the possibility of such intervention, notions which existed in East Europe, introduced corrections

into its internal development; we need only recall the political struggle in Poland in 1980-1981.

Although in the past the "internal activity" of the Warsaw Pact did not—even in the most dramatic cases—lead to direct military confrontation between the East and the West, its influence on world politics was significant. For example, the bringing of Soviet troops into Hungary in October 1956 evoked deep disappointment on the part of those people in the West who had welcomed the process of de-Stalinizing the Soviet Union started by N. Khrushchev, and who had placed great hopes on overcoming the cold war. The events of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia hampered the development of the process which was subsequently termed detente. At the same time, any attempts on the part of Western countries to expand their political influence in East Europe and to stimulate the development of East European countries in the direction preferable to the West invariably gave rise to concern and sharp reaction in the Soviet Union. As has been shown in practice, **East Europe may become the source of a more serious threat to positive changes in international relations than conflicts in Third World countries.**

What is awaiting the Warsaw Pact in the future? Of course, very much depends here on the success or failure of perestroika in the USSR and also on the general dynamics of East-West relations. Defeat of the reformers in the Soviet Union and the coming to power of a conservative political leadership, in combination with a sharp deterioration in world politics and with a new outbreak of the cold war, could lead to attempts to return to the traditional relations between the USSR and East Europe. At the same time, preservation of the current trends in Soviet foreign and domestic policy is offering East Europe a chance, unprecedented over the entire postwar period, to choose the paths of its further development independently.

Is this freedom of choice, which was enunciated by M. Gorbachev, compatible with the preservation of the Warsaw Pact? So far, what we see are largely disintegration trends. The allies' mutual assurances of loyalty and of allegiance to obligations have given way to a different type of discussion: those on the expediency of preserving allied relations. A discussion of the prospects of the alliance has revealed a number of sensitive points.

For example, some people believe that the Warsaw Pact is inadmissibly restricting the sovereignty of its East European member states and is putting real obstacles on the path of their democratization, economic reforms, and participation as full and equal states in the world community of nations. This organization is referred to first and foremost as "Moscow's key lever for applying pressure." Such arguments are not infrequent, for example in Hungary and Poland. However, calls for a revision of the treaties which are currently in force evoke concern and nervousness on the part of those people who see in the Warsaw Pact a means for guaranteeing the security of the allies and the stability of their internal

political development. In giving general outlines of the disposition of forces, it is also necessary to mention the inertia in the work of the current mechanism of the bloc, whose representatives are both looking forward to reforms and resisting them, often simultaneously, as is frequently the case with representatives of bureaucratic organizations.

It is possible that many of the Warsaw Pact's present problems are being excessively dramatized by the participants in the discussion, and it is also possible that they are not. However, irrespective of the diagnosis, one has to take into consideration the external symptoms: The debates have generated tension in relations, and even something which may be referred to as signs of a crisis of confidence cannot be ruled out. The situation is too serious to allow oneself to temporize.

We should not cherish a naive hope that it is possible to find a certain super-answer, a kind of conceptual "philosophers' stone" which will put things in order and restore the lost tranquility at one go. Such an answer is simply impossible, if only by virtue of the dynamic development of events within the Warsaw Pact and outside it. The genuine task is less ambitious but more down-to-earth: It lies in adaptating the bloc's work to changing circumstances.

Has the Warsaw Pact the right to exist at all? Are the incentives for unity sufficiently stable?

Even in the Soviet Union, statements to the effect that the Warsaw Pact has long since turned into a millstone around the neck of the USSR and that it belongs to those alliances from which it is time to rid ourselves are heard with increasing frequency. Indeed, at present, the preservation of the Warsaw Pact can hardly be justified by the interests of USSR security alone. During the postwar period, the strategy of creating "buffer states" and "security zones" still made some sense; today, modern nuclear weapons systems have minimized the significance of geographic factors of security. Perhaps for the first time over the entire postwar period, attitudes have clearly manifested themselves in the USSR which are close to the desire to "withdraw from Europe" characteristic of some Americans over at least the past two decades.

With regard to the economic relations between the USSR and the countries of East Europe, here too a legitimate question is being asked: Are these really the partners toward whom we must orientate ourselves first and foremost? Would it not be better to direct efforts toward developing economic relations with South Korea, Singapore, or Brazil, those young economic giants? Or should we proceed more decisively onto the markets of the West European countries "over the heads" of our East European allies?

Radically minded Soviet political scientists express an assumption that a model of relations with East European countries such as the one which has already been tested in Soviet-Finnish relations would better conform to the interests of the USSR than that of the Warsaw Pact.

Indeed, while remaining a capitalist and neutral country, Finland has created far fewer problems for the Soviet Union over the entire postwar period than have socialist Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. A "Finlandization" of East Europe would mean giving the states of this region full political independence (including the freedom to choose models of social development), while allowing for the interests of USSR security.

Similar attitudes also exist in other socialist countries, and there they are further aggravated, among other things, by the heavy burden of the past. Why should Hungary, for example, consider itself bound by relations with the Soviet Union if it does not experience any serious fears of the "threat coming from the West"? In Hungary, some political forces even advocate not the "Finnish" but rather the "Austrian" variant which would presuppose an even greater alienation from the USSR and rapprochement with West Europe. Why should Poland develop integration if economic reforms in the USSR are just stuck in a rut?

However, in our opinion, common interests in the preservation and development of allied relations do exist. First and foremost, there are vast economic ties between those Warsaw Pact countries which need political support at a state level. Economic reorientation toward the West is a sufficiently difficult task for any of the allies. Whereas before, acting in isolation, the countries of East Europe could obtain certain preferential conditions for economic cooperation with the West (simply by virtue of demonstrating one degree of "independence" from the Soviet Union or another), now that the West is giving up the views which were characteristic of the cold war period, it appears that the political value of such "autonomy" will decrease.

The situation will become ever more complicated for the East European countries after 1992, when West Europe enters a qualitatively new stage in its economic and political development, a stage connected, in particular, with a colossal expansion of the potential of its internal market and with an increase of its need for internal investments. The trend toward the economic self-isolation of West Europe, trend which makes itself felt even today, will receive a powerful new impulse. The maximum that the countries of East Europe may count on in these conditions is competition with the countries of North Africa and the Near East for the position of "unskilled workers" in a united 21st-century Europe. Even Yugoslavia, which is more involved in West European economic relations than any other East European state will, in all probability, be relegated to the periphery of the European division of labor. It is possible that only the GDR, a de facto member of the "Common Market" via the system of its relations with the FRG, will find itself in a relatively favorable situation.

Preservation of the Warsaw Pact Organization is also expedient from a political point of view. Unilateral elimination of this military-political alliance in East Europe may have a destabilizing effect on East-West

relations. We cannot disagree with S. Walt's opinion that the main task facing the leadership of the USSR and the United States lies in "working out a new view of the European order which is capable of creating a foundation for stability. This, among other things, would signify a departure from hasty radical proposals. Taking into account the achievements of the past 40 years, we must create a new order without haste and with great caution."

Unilateral elimination of the Warsaw Pact may also further aggravate contradictions between East European countries and alleviate the undesirable process whereby many historical controversies associated with the territorial claims of some countries upon others and with interethnic contradictions are coming to the fore. This is, in particular, rightly pointed out by J. Snyder: "In East Europe, conflicts on questions of national reunion are already taking shape and ideological differences between ideologically orthodox and reformist states can be observed.... If it so happens that Pandora's box is opened, East Europe may return to those faulty models of domestic and foreign policy, adherence to which led to the outbreak of two world wars."²

Finally, the fact that the Warsaw Pact member states have very much in common in their political culture, traditions, way of life, and attitude to the world speaks in favor of the preservation of the Warsaw Pact. In all likelihood, we can speak of two levels of this communality. The first of them is historical or "presocialist": Some states of the region are united by a common religion, others by the philosophy of Pan-Slavism, and still others by their former membership of a single state formation. The roots of this communality go far back into history.

The second level of the communality of East European countries is "socialist" and is the result of the past 40 years' development of the continent. Given all the differences between these countries, the four decades of "rapprochement between the levels of development" and the manifestations of the "general laws of socialism" have by no means been wasted. Unification has also significantly affected social consciousness: The majority of the population of all the East European countries consists of people who were born after World War II, people who were raised under conditions of stringent political control, the administrative command system of management of the economy, and other attributes of Stalinism and its subsequent modifications. This is why some most important sociopsychological characteristics of the population of the Warsaw Pact Organization member states have much in common.

The similarity of political cultures is supplemented by their intensive interaction. For example, over all the postwar decades, attempts to carry out political "liberalization" or economic transformations in any of the East European countries have provoked an animated response among the Soviet intelligentsia and among national or religious minorities in the Soviet Union, and the processes of de-Stalinization or "Brezhnevization"

in the USSR have left a deep imprint on the evolution of the countries of East Europe. Today, 75 percent of the socialist countries' trade is conducted among themselves; scientific, cultural, and humanitarian contacts between these countries are also on a similar scale.

Thus, prerequisites exist for the preservation of the Warsaw Pact Organization. However, what type of an alliance should it be? **The Warsaw Pact may only survive if it manages to transform itself into a union of states enjoying equal rights.** We need a more mature political alliance. We must reject the Stalinist legacy in relations between the Soviet Union and East Europe.

Our alliance must be based on the real and not formal equality of its participants. The USSR must decisively abandon its paternalistic attitude toward the countries of East Europe and renounce those actions of the past which had placed these countries in the position of satellites and not of allies.

Our alliance must be tolerant toward the diversity of the member countries' social structures and toward the diversity of their political institutions and social life, in short, toward the diversity of their models of development.

Our alliance must be ready for serious disagreements and sometimes even for contradictions. The USSR and Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia simply cannot have "complete unity of views" as there cannot be complete unity of views even in the case of two closest friends.

Besides, to all appearances, the Soviet Union should not overreact in connection with a possible increase of western influence in East Europe. At present, the prestige and authority of the USSR and of its leadership among the population of the East European countries have significantly increased. Many past wrongs, if not forgotten, have at least lost their acuteness. It is also very important that in recent years it has become possible to "deinternationalize" the internal problems of the East European countries—few people today would associate them with a possibility of Soviet intervention.

The past years have provided no small amount of evidence of the fact that the former "principles" of USSR policy in East Europe are becoming a thing of the past. In all likelihood, this may alleviate the problem of improving allied relations.

The development of the political mechanisms of the alliance, mechanisms which are, as a matter of fact, presently only in an embryonic state, may become one of the paths in this direction. Impressive names such as those of the Political Consultative Committee or the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs are unable to conceal the poor development of the political structures. The question of a further politicization of Warsaw Pact activity is becoming particularly topical. Steps directed toward a relaxation of political confrontation in Europe,

in addition to their contribution to the cause of preserving peace, have yet another aspect: They inevitably weaken the military foundation of the partnership of the Warsaw Pact allies. These "losses" may and must be welcomed. However, are the ties in other spheres sufficiently well developed and strong? Have the preconditions been created for a change of emphasis in the activity of the Warsaw Pact Organization?

It must be admitted that today it is more difficult to make a turn toward a greater politicization of the Warsaw Pact than it was at earlier stages of its existence. The action of powerful centrifugal forces is now being felt in the Warsaw Pact, and the advocates of a further development of its political structures must be able to prove to sceptics and opponents the desirability of the measures which they are suggesting. Indisputably, the Soviet Union has already missed favorable conditions. Had the strengthening of the bloc's political structures been started in a situation of stability and the incontestable leadership of the USSR, the corresponding proposals would have been perceived as a manifestation of confidence with respect to the allies and as a sign of readiness to draw them into the decisionmaking process to a greater extent. Unfortunately, in those years the policy of the USSR was characterized by "royal arrogance" toward the development of the mechanisms guaranteeing a coordination of the political courses of the allied countries. The main channels of operation were party ties, through which the Soviet point of view could be dictated were mainly operated.

The complexity of creating a mature political alliance in East Europe is also due to the fact that sometimes, growing economic and political difficulties give rise to nationalist sentiments. Nationalism directed both against the Soviet Union and against its East European neighbors is becoming a powerful factor. This factor operates not only at the level of mass social consciousness but also at state level.

Another complication lies in the fact that the alliance will have to be restructured in conditions where reforms in East European countries are proceeding at different rates and in dissimilar forms. This may cause differences between them and impede the coordination of actions. To all appearances, only the visible success of the reforms and of the new mechanisms of cooperation may neutralize nationalism and speed up the transformations in these states.

In supporting the expediency of strengthening the political structures of the alliance one must immediately emphasize that the steps being proposed are directed first and foremost at relaxing tension in the relations between the allies, and that they are not aimed against anybody in the world at large. It might be a good idea to abandon right away those loud epithets with which Soviet propaganda so often used to juggle in the past. An improvement in the political mechanism of the Warsaw Pact will inevitably meet with mistrust on the part of

many people in the West, and it is necessary to do everything possible to dissipate the fears which may arise.

Reform of the Warsaw Pact must lead to the creation of a permanent political headquarters for the bloc. It could be stationed in one of the capitals of the member countries, in Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague, for example. It would be expedient to provide for three levels in the structure of such an organization. One of them would be an international collective of a secretariat working under the guidance of the general secretary of the Warsaw Pact. The second level would consist of permanent delegations of the member countries, whose leaders would regularly assemble at sessions of the Warsaw Pact. The third level would be made up of permanent and temporary committees and subcommittees dealing with a wide range of problems. The measures being proposed do not, of course, question the usefulness of the higher political organs of the Warsaw Pact which already exist—the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Today, one can only speculate as to what appearance the Warsaw Pact headquarters might acquire. At the same time, it is clear that this must be an organ capable of looking for and finding political solutions which are acceptable to the allied countries.

The proposal to create multilevel headquarters inevitably provokes the following questions: Won't the new structures duplicate the work of those which already exist and of the communication channels between the members of the bloc? Isn't it possible to do without additional expenditure on an expensive project such as the creation of the Warsaw Pact headquarters? The main point is whether the political mechanism, in supplementing the military one, will strengthen Soviet domination in the Warsaw Pact?

In our opinion, the creation of a permanent Warsaw Pact headquarters will make it possible, first, to systematize and put in order the various and diverse contacts within the bloc, which will inevitably have a positive effect on their effectiveness. Second, the task of creating new political institutions within the Warsaw Pact is acquiring particular importance in conditions of political changes in the member countries of the alliance, countries which are making new demands with regard to the organization of intrabloc dialogue. The latter point would appear to require further elucidation. As is well known, a tradition has taken shape within the Warsaw Pact Organization according to which many questions are resolved through party rather than state channels. This practice has become possible, in particular, by virtue of the similarity of structure of the ruling parties in the socialist countries, their comparable status in social life, and the well developed ties between them. Now, the situation is rapidly changing. In Hungary and Poland, for example, qualitatively new movements have emerged on the political arena, and state organs are being created which are pluralistic in composition. In the conditions which are

taking shape, party channels of interstate dialogue are beginning to break down. What we are facing here is an obvious need to create more neutral structures for interaction within the bloc, structures which will be more resistant to changes in the political situation inside individual member-countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The permanent political structures of the Warsaw Pact must be able to provide a satisfactory analysis of any question which may arise and to elaborate an acceptable decision on it. Such a highly flexible system of organs must be created without haste and with particular caution in the matter of apportioning additional means and expanding the number of functioning institutions.

A politicization of the Warsaw Pact will significantly increase this organization's stability and will create prerequisites for expanding cooperation between the allied countries in areas which are crucially important for their interests. The permanent political organs of the bloc, playing the role of a kind of buffer, will reduce the likelihood of the situation getting out of control, will help avoid or limit the negative consequences of political contradictions, and will facilitate the achievement of a compromise.

Perestroika of the activity of the Warsaw Pact Organization would be a convincing confirmation of the peaceful intentions of the USSR and its allies, and evidence of their practical readiness to strive to change international relations on the continent in the spirit of new thinking. In addition to this, the emergence of new Warsaw Pact political institutions may, by expanding the field of possible interaction, substantially alleviate the interbloc dialogue with NATO.

The development of the political mechanism of the Warsaw Pact and the transition to a more mature political partnership may render invaluable help in the cause of integrating its members into the world system of interrelations and smoothing their path onto the world market. This market does not like inexperienced and clumsy novices. It is difficult for them to break through into the main areas of the international division of labor. Time will be needed for adapting to the worldwide rules of the game. At first, the Warsaw Pact member countries will inevitably have to clash with attempts to force them into minor roles and to infringe upon their interests in one sphere or another. Under these conditions, close interaction of the Warsaw Pact Organization member countries, including that on political issues, may turn out to be a perceptible advantage in their struggle for a place in the sun. On the one hand, the previously accumulated experience of such cooperation and, on the other hand, the similarity of the problems which the Warsaw Pact allies will face speak in favor of **rapprochement in the interests of development.**

The formation of a mature political partnership is also improving the prospects for a joint exploitation by the Warsaw Pact member countries of their huge internal market. The "internal safety-valve" will be particularly

valuable in conditions of difficulties on external markets. Unless large-scale and thoroughly balanced political decisions are taken, it will hardly be possible to transform cooperation between the Warsaw Pact members in the economic sphere into an important source of their strength.

1. Walt, Stephen. "Preservation of Peace in Europe: Maintenance of the Status Quo."—SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1990, No. 2

2. Snyder, Jack. "Democratization in Eastern Europe and the Stability of International Relations."—SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1990, No. 2)

NATO, Warsaw Pact Interaction Assessed

904K0007D Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 3, March 1990 (signed to press 20 February 1990) pp 36-39

[Article by Vladimir Georgiyevich Baranovskiy, doctor of historical sciences, section head at the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute: "An Optimal Model of Interaction between the Blocs"]

[Text] A drastic acceleration of international political development is under way in Europe. The process of overcoming East-West confrontation, which has started on the initiative of the USSR, is acquiring qualitatively new features in connection with the deep internal changes that are taking place in virtually all East European countries. As a matter of fact, prospects are emerging for a fundamental perestroika of the entire system of interstate relations which has existed on the continent for several decades.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization are the key elements in this system. Its transformation naturally poses the question of the role of these alliances. One can, of course, look at the problem from a "radical" standpoint: If we are concerned with overcoming confrontation between the states belonging to two systems in Europe and achieving demilitarization in their interrelationships, we must also resolutely give up these military-political organizations which are the main attributes of the cold war era.

However, this logic seems to be too forthright and even oversimplified. It appears that it does not look very attractive even at the level of real political practice, either in the West or in the East. It seems to me that the traditional statements of the members of NATO on the necessity of increasing its role have begun to acquire a less ritualistic character in recent months and are increasingly reflecting these members' genuine interest in the preservation and enhancement of this organization's ability to function. There are also some significant changes in the Soviet approach. In the not too distant past, our ideas about the necessity of eliminating the

blocs took the form of specific proposals which we were striving to discuss with our Western partners if not today, then at least tomorrow. Now, the stress is on a different point: It is being emphasized that changes in Europe must necessarily take account of political realities, which include, in particular, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

A question arises: Is it simply the force of inertia which operates here or do some quite serious rational considerations exist which could be used to substantiate the preservation of old mechanisms under new conditions? In order to answer this question it might be useful to consider once again the role of these organizations and the functions which they fulfill, and at the same time, to try to determine how each of them correlates with the processes that are taking place in Europe.

One can now see a possibility of overcoming the rigid confrontational structure of the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I believe that this is connected first and foremost with two circumstances: on the one hand, with a devaluation of the role of military force in international relations and, on the other, with a reappraisal of the character and essence of the threats to security.

When the armed forces of both sides, equipped with the most up-to-date types of weaponry, are in a state of enhanced combat readiness, a most insignificant incident or an incorrect interpretation of the opponent's actions or intentions might trigger a large-scale war. This is particularly so because the high concentration of armed forces and armaments and, above all, the presence of considerable stocks of tactical nuclear weapons and missiles in the zone of immediate contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, may lead to the delivery of a preventive strike with the aim of disabling the opposing side's most effective systems before they are launched. Besides, such fears may naturally be mutual in character and the time available for taking decisions may amount to days and hours instead of weeks and months. Unfortunately, such a scenario for the outbreak of an armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact looks by no means far-fetched or preposterous.

It is precisely for this reason that each of the sides is anxious not to allow the military balance to be violated to the opponent's advantage. However, this balance may be maintained in different ways: either by building up one's own potential, something which was common practice until quite recently and which, moreover, not infrequently involved certain "extras" which naturally evoked apprehension on the part of the opposing side and, in turn, encouraged it to take analogous actions; or, conversely, by creating incentives for the opposing side to refrain from reinforcing its military potential and striving to reduce the level of military confrontation.

The former line had dominated over the entire postwar period. The second line is just starting to gather strength. In the final analysis, it presupposes a reorientation

toward nonmilitary means of safeguarding security which will, in all probability, be a lengthy process. When this path is covered completely, it will no longer be necessary to maintain military alliances in Europe. So far, however, only the first steps are being made toward this goal—extremely important steps, because we are dealing with an attempt to change a trend which gathered force over several decades, but steps which have yet to radically change the situation.

In order to achieve this, each side must adjust its line of conduct associated with military support of security. Of course, such amendments can be implemented by them unilaterally, as was done by the Warsaw Pact member states when they adopted a decision on reducing their military preparations. However, only joint actions by the sides can lead to more substantial results, change the general vector of movement, and guarantee truly irreversible changes. A new theme in the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would appear to emerge from this: In the sphere of military preparations, they can no longer be reduced simply to mutual countermeasures but must also include a certain degree of constructive cooperation.

It is precisely this formula—"constructive cooperation"—which will, in my opinion, characterize the optimum model of relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact by the end of the current century, although it is already necessary in connection with the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. It would also be useful for comparing military doctrines, for discussing criteria for reasonable sufficiency of military potentials and nonoffensive defense, and for analysing nuclear weapons problems in Europe. A need may also arise for certain joint organs or actions—for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of agreements on arms reduction or on confidence-building measures, for example.

Of course, if one speaks of a more distant future, it is also possible to foresee the gradual demise of military-political alliances in Europe, alliances which will have to be superseded by a common European security system. Development in this direction will probably proceed via a relative decrease in the role of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military mechanisms proper and a kind of demilitarization and politicization of these alliances. It is difficult to say when we will reach a level of mutual relations, at which it might be possible to smoothly "abolish" the military-political alliances existing in Europe. It is clear, however, that their hasty dismantling may lead to a situation in which the existing (and operating) mechanisms are broken but no new ones yet exist. The formation of new structures underpinned by nonmilitary means of guaranteeing security will require a certain amount of time, even in the case of the most favorable development of events.

Meanwhile, in today's Europe, the Warsaw Pact and NATO are the main load-bearing structures in the sphere of East-West military-political interrelations. If these

structures give way, new "fulcrums" may be required. Thus, it is precisely through the North Atlantic alliance that the United States' military-political presence in Europe is being ensured, a presence which is seen by many in Europe as absolutely necessary to counterbalance the obvious geostrategic advantages of the USSR on the continent. If the involution of NATO and a decrease in the American contribution to the cause of "defending" the allies proceed against a background of continued confrontational relations between the countries of the two systems, this may create additional incentives for boosting military preparations in Western Europe and developing military-political integration in the region.

In view of the fact that the European system of interstate relations is entering a transitional phase, the problem of securing stability in conditions of ongoing rapid and profound changes is acquiring exceptional significance. Military-political alliances can make their own contribution to resolving this problem. Each one of these alliances appears in the role of an important political and institutional structure which organizes the interrelations between its member states.

The use of an expanded interpretation of this function as a political validation of interference in the internal affairs of the allies (as was the case in 1968 in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia) are becoming things of the past. The general line of international political development, from bipolarity to multipolarity, is also obvious. This is manifested not only in the emergence of new "centers of power" in the global system of interstate relations, but also in the development of centrifugal processes within the main military-political alliances.

There is no doubt that this trend is leading to a democratization of interstate relations, but it is also making them more complicated. The postwar division of Europe has pushed into the background many problems which had existed between the countries which became allies. Under conditions of decreasing East-West confrontation some of these problems may be revived. There are hardly any grounds for dramatizing the situation, yet one should not forget about this aspect of the matter either. This would seem to apply first and foremost to the Warsaw Pact member states. After all, our alliance is seeking to overcome the rigidly centralized scheme of organizing the interrelations between the member states. These states are acquiring genuine equality and are gaining the right to vote which they had been virtually deprived of for a long time. At the same time, sharp activization of various social movements (including those which are quite immature and sometimes inclined to advance not very well thought-out or even frankly adventurist slogans) is taking place in all East European countries. Under such conditions, certain very painful and acute questions (for example, those concerning policy toward national minorities or even the character of territorial changes after the war) are capable of destabilizing the situation. It is possible that the corresponding countries may find it easier to arrive at a

compromise if they maintain their allied relations. It is true, however, that this requires a genuine democratization of the Warsaw Pact and its transformation into a political rather than a defensive alliance.

The question of the further fate of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is acquiring particular significance in the light of the "German question" which has emerged in the political foreground again. This is evidently not the proper place to consider it in essence. I will only point out what is on the surface: While no open resistance to the forthcoming rapprochement between the FRG and the GDR is observed in practice (although far from all Europeans are enthusiastic about such a prospect), serious apprehension with regard to their possible unification is being voiced, both directly and indirectly. It is quite remarkable that the participation of the two German states in different military-political alliances is not infrequently regarded as one of the most serious obstacles to their merger.

At the same time, the idea of neutralizing the two Germanys as a condition for their union is, as a rule, rejected in the West. The logic of the argument is this: A state formation, the largest in Europe, such as a united Germany might become, will possess such a significant economic, political, and, in the final analysis, military potential that it will inevitably begin to dominate in the region. This invalidates the idea of German neutrality. This is why a completely opposite approach is proposed: Today, the Germans should already be drawn as deeply as possible into a system of various ties with other countries so that, even in the case of a unification, they would not obtain complete freedom of action, remaining hostages to this dense network of interdependence. Hence the following conclusion: It is necessary now, while the development of the "German question" has not yet gone out of control, to strive for the greatest possible activation of FRG participation in NATO (if developments proceed toward reunion, the GDR should also be included in this alliance).

The latter thesis appears to be not only unrealistic but also provocative. I do not think, however, that this cancels the question of the possible role of the existing alliances in the forthcoming development of the "German question." On the contrary, their stabilizing effect could have major significance both for maintaining the status quo and for overcoming it on the basis of a search for decisions acceptable to the entire international community; this may be done, for example, by way of achieving consensus on this question (or even by discussing the terms of a peace treaty!) at the Warsaw Pact-NATO level, which would also enable the four victor powers of World War 2, the German states themselves, and their immediate neighbors (Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the Benelux countries) to voice their opinions.

This is yet another argument in favor of a gradual transformation of the two military-political alliances in

Europe, alliances which had long been an instrument of confrontation between East and West, into structures of dialogue.

Freedom of Choice in Military Pacts Considered

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[Article by Valeriy Arnoldovich Mazing, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific worker at the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute: "Freedom of Choice Must Be Guaranteed"]

[Text] The state of international relations on the European continent to a large extent depends on the level of development and interaction between the two leading military-political alliances: the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO.

We must seriously consider the opinion of those researchers and experts who maintain that the emergence of these alliances and the creation of the corresponding organizational and operational-technical structures has contributed to maintaining a certain level of security and stability in Europe throughout the postwar period. As is well known, adherents of the "deterrence" concept in the NATO countries are convinced that it is precisely thanks to the existence of an effective military bloc which has at its disposal the most up-to-date means of warfare and, above all, nuclear munitions, that it became possible to prevent the Soviet Union from using military power for achieving its political and ideological ends.

The reciprocal measure taken by the USSR and its allies—the formation of the Warsaw Pact Organization with its well developed mechanism of cooperation and mutual assistance, with its powerful opposing bloc of armed forces and armaments, and with a possibility of their actual utilization during periods of acute political crises—has directly contributed to neutralizing the well-known and serious threats on the part of the West.

At the same time, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the procedural mechanism elaborated and adopted by the member countries, the decision to use troops and armaments which are part of the joint armed forces of either alliance is not an exclusive privilege of one state (including the USSR and the United States) but is subject to coordination and approval by all the allies. This circumstance is a restraining factor on the use of military power in Europe.

However, the development of the military-political relations in Europe during the postwar period had a quite distinct confrontational character which, as already pointed out by V.G. Baranovskiy, was largely due to the creation of the two alliances. Those were organizations which emerged during the cold war years and their

activity bore an imprint of the time and of anti-American and anti-West (the Warsaw Pact) and anti-Soviet and antisocialist (NATO) orientation. Transformation of the European continent into the most arms- and armed forces-saturated region of the world was the ultimate result of this development of events.

The process of historical and qualitative transformations, which started in the USSR in the mid-eighties, has changed European realities. Today, individual details and elements of a "common European home" are still barely visible. It is assumed that there will be no reason for quarrels or conflicts in this home, and therefore maintenance of large quantities of arms and their development and improvement will become senseless. It is assumed that the mechanism of cooperation between European countries will reach a new qualitative level in all spheres of activity, including exchange of people and ideas, spiritual and material values. It is, finally, assumed that in the longterm, owing to the joint efforts of all European nations a united and integral Europe will be restored as a highly developed, secure, ecologically pure, and socially prosperous region of the world.

With this in mind, this is the time to think about the future role, tasks, and significance of the two blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The very fact of their existence is by no means everlasting, and there is no doubt that time will come when disintegration of the bloc structure on the continent will become inevitable and the divided Europe will be replaced by a system of common European collective security. The Soviet Union, as is well known, has repeatedly expressed its readiness for disbanding, on a mutual basis, the military-political blocs in Europe. However, it looks as if this will not happen in the foreseeable future. It appears that at least until the end of the current century, the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will to a large extent determine the character of development of the entire complex of relations in Europe. Judging by the statements of Western military-political leaders, their adherence to the bloc structure of Europe remains, so far, unchanged. This follows, in particular, from documents of the latest NATO Council session at the level of heads of states and governments (Brussels, May 1989) and this has also been invariably declared by the leaders of NATO. It may be appropriate to refer to the opinion of M. Werner, NATO's general secretary, which he expressed in September 1989 in a conversation with a group of Soviet journalists and reiterated one month later at a NATO assembly in Brussels, to the effect that "in the year 2000, the two military alliances will still be in existence, even in the case of a considerable improvement in relations between the countries of East and West Europe." It can hardly be expected that the complex, highly developed, and generally effective structures which have been created over decades could be dismantled, even stage-by-stage, in such a short time, on the path toward establishing a new peaceful order in Europe. One should also keep in mind that despite a known rise in the level of European stability and security, confrontations and differences of opinion could not, so far, be

fully eradicated. It is unlikely that we will be able to avoid them in the future, even if perceptible progress is achieved in the sphere of arms reduction and strengthening the system of European security.

Today, it is quite difficult to predict, in terms of either the duration or character of development, the future course of the process of political and socioeconomic changes in East European countries. One should not thereby rule out the possibility of class, socioeconomic, national, ethnic, and other contradictions being exacerbated, both within individual states and between some countries of the Warsaw Pact. Preservation of the bloc structure and of the allied mechanism will make it possible to resolve more constructively and with greater care the problems which may arise in this connection. One must believe that the West can not be interested either in a destabilization of the situation or in the emergence of conflicts or crisis points on the European political map, not even if this would concern first and foremost their long-standing political opponents.

The necessity of modernization, of organizational and structural changes in the military-political alliances, and of a shift in the tenor of their activity is a different matter—it seems to me that all participants in our discussion agree with this. Here, the main trend appears to be toward politicization and deideologization of the blocs and toward continuation and intensification of those processes which have been vigorously developing over the past three to four years. Much has already been done in this direction: Organs and institutions exist within both alliances which make it possible to conduct a mutual dialogue and consultations, primarily in the political, scientific-technological, and humanitarian rather than the military sphere. At the same time, quite significant changes in essence are envisaged in the functional mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and in the methods and style of their activity.

The principle of freedom of choice which was enunciated by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations in December 1988 must become a basic principle: "Freedom of choice is a universal principle which must not know any exceptions." This concerns not only questions of the internal political and socioeconomic activity of individual states but also their right to participate in various economic, trade, financial, and other international organizations and their right of secession from military-political alliances. In my opinion, the possibility of such development of events must be discussed in the near future at a consultative meeting (conference) of the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states, where political and legal recommendations must be elaborated. Such a meeting could primarily be held at a scientific-expertise level, whereas a corresponding document must be adopted by high-ranking political figures of the blocs' member states. Of exceptional importance appears to be the attainment by the sides of mutual understanding on the question of working out guarantees of political neutrality

for those states which will exercise their right of freedom of choice in order to secede from the military-political alliances.

Subsequently, consultative meetings (conferences) of NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be held on a regular basis for joint discussion of the most important problems of the activity of the two alliances. In the future, it would be appropriate to think about creating a permanent interbloc organ which could become a coordinating center for exchanging information, discussing and elaborating coordinated decisions on the entire complex of European questions, including those connected with preventing the unsanctioned use of arms, accidental outbreak of an armed conflict or for blocking the development of a conflict while still at its lowest possible level. Both sides—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—are interested in the availability of an active mechanism which could effectively guarantee practical implementation of the principles of the inviolability of boundaries and territorial integrity of European states, principles stipulated in the Helsinki agreements.

Finally, I would like to express my disagreement with two theses advanced by Professor Walt. In accordance with his reasoning, an optimum model of European security could be guaranteed with a rather high level of military confrontation being maintained on the continent, both nuclear and conventional arms stocks further built up, and economic and social contacts between East and West gradually curtailed. His comparison of world trade and economic relations, which existed on the eve of World Wars I and II, to those in the present stage of development of foreign economic ties is, in my opinion, not quite justifiable. A significant quantitative growth in the internationalization of economic life has occurred in the postwar years. Interpenetration of capitals, expansion of scientific-technological and industrial cooperation, and the development of transnational technological ties and cooperation deliveries—all this has raised international economic relations to an unprecedented level of interdependence. Under these conditions, any conceivable advantages, even those associated with inflicting a military defeat on a competitor, are unable to compensate for the actual economic and trade costs. In economic terms, war and military operations are becoming not only hopeless and senseless ventures for any state but also extremely dangerous ones, threatening economic disaster. In our interrelated and interdependent world, not only a military but even a major political conflict is fraught with dangerous consequences for the economies and economic mechanisms of all developed states.

As of today, the point of view that, the more military strength is accumulated the higher the level of security and the more reliable the stability will be, has also become obsolete. A different pattern is obvious: the accumulation and qualitative improvement of weapons and the elaboration and adoption of various doctrines and concepts of their utilization increase the risk of an outbreak of war. Security cannot be based indefinitely on the essentially immoral principles of intimidation and

fear of retaliation. If the arms race continues, then, first, outbreaks in some areas of military technical competition, violation of the existing balance of power, and temptation to use arms cannot be ruled out, and, second, further uncontrolled introduction of the most recent achievements of science and technology into the military structure may lead to a case when political situation is no longer controlled by human will and desire but becomes a hostage to military technocratic logic.

The best way of strengthening security and stability must be through curtailing the arms race, lowering military potentials, and reducing armed forces and armaments. It goes without saying that quantitative reduction of armaments alone cannot resolve all the problems of strengthening security and military-strategic stability. The reductions themselves are not the only possible measure and, under certain circumstances, they are even capable of destabilizing the military-political situation. They must be accompanied by a complex of military-political, operational, and military technical measures which are called upon to materially reinforce the principles of the defensive orientation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We may concern ourselves with a structural perestroika of the armed forces toward defense, with a redeployment of the most destabilizing army subunits and types of weapons (their withdrawal by a considerable distance from the line of contact between the two blocs and the creation in these areas of barrier and separation zones), with organizing a large-scale and effective system of measures for ensuring mutual trust and verification, and so on. This whole range of questions undoubtedly concerns the future of the relations between all member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and must become a subject of a joint discussion.

1. See Walt, Stephen: "Preservation of Peace in Europe: Maintenance of the Status Quo." *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA*. 1990, No. 2)

Europe Enters 'New Period of Its History'

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[Article by Yuriy Pavlovich Davydov, doctor of historical sciences, director of the Center for European Studies at the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute: "Toward a New European Order"]

[Text] Europe, although geopolitically united, has never been so in a purely political sense. It has always been partitioned off by national boundaries and divided into alliances and coalitions. During the postwar period, the continent began to be polarized according to socioideological criteria. At the same time, the idea of a united Europe is as old as Europe itself. Julius Caesar, the German emperor Charles V, Kant, Voltaire, Metternich, Saint-Simon, and even Hitler pictured it in different ways. There were attempts to create it on the basis of

either brute force or pure reason. Neither the former, nor the latter could form a basis for uniting Europe: Force lacked reason, as is always the case, and reason lacked force.

Europe is now entering a new period of its history. Changes are taking place in all directions without exception:

- perestroika in the Soviet Union and its new political thinking which is abandoning the dogmas of administrative command socialism;
- transformation of East Europe and of its relations both with the USSR and the West, its desire to abandon the schemes which have been traditionally imposed on it by the great powers—whether these schemes might imply a “sanitary cordon” or a “socialist community with its collective responsibility for the fate of socialism” in other countries—and to find, at long last, its own face which would not irritate the neighbors either in the West or in the East;
- West Europe’s striving to acquire a new quality after 1992. The increased power of the European community is already making itself felt in East Europe and overseas and is introducing serious amendments into the configuration of forces in the world;
- an inevitability for the United States, which is experiencing a considerable pressure from its internal and external problems under the conditions of a less dangerous world, of reassessing the country’s role in contemporary world and elaborating its own new thinking;
- the necessity of resolving, irrespective of the scheme of the new European order, the question of the future of the two German states, which concerns not only the fates of the GDR and the FRG, but also the interests of the entire continent, of the United States and Canada.

The changes are taking place not only within individual countries or regions but also in the system of their interrelations. The “enemy image” is wearing increasingly thin both in the East and in the West and the level of mutual threat is abating. The agreement reached in Vienna within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the concluding document which was signed there, and the beginning of negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe—all these are a visible reflection of the changes. However, today, these negotiations no longer keep pace with the political changes in the eastern part of the continent.

Under the influence of these changes, an understanding is becoming firmly established that the former East-West confrontation can be overcome. The relationships between the European states, the United States and Canada could be increasingly based on a system of common values which have turned out to be much

greater in quantity than had been expected by many sceptics and ideologists on both sides and not on a particular configuration of forces on the continent, that is on antagonism. They could ultimately be based on the cooperation of East and West in Europe, on their adaptation to one another, on an expansion of their interdependence, and on their mutual security, that is on combining efforts for overcoming the split. A Europe which will emerge on the basis of such interaction, coming after a period of considerable improvements and shocks, may acquire a political stability and communality much greater than before.

In view of the fact that, in their domestic and foreign policy, both East and West are increasingly gravitating toward a common system of values (political pluralism, inalienable human rights and freedoms, market economy, reasonable sufficiency in the sphere of external policy and security, respect for the sovereignty of not only adversaries but of friends as well, and so on), a real basis emerges for creating an integral and democratic Europe which will be able to regulate the general processes of political and economic life while preserving the national consciousness of the states, peoples, and communities within it.

The fluid situation in Europe is beginning to undermine many of the former structures of international relations, those which took shape during the cold war period and were orientated toward maintaining confrontation. Until quite recently, these structures—the blocs in Europe, the military presence on the territory of some of its countries, the character of multilateral and bilateral relations within alliances which are based on the leadership of the USSR or the United States, and so on—functioned more or less smoothly and were able to overcome shocks and contradictions which emerged within the system. They are now failing increasingly often and a structural crisis in international relations has become a fact, in any case it is particularly obvious along the line the United States—West Europe—East Europe—the USSR. Even in our discussion here we are more often talking about Europe and are less frequently dividing it into West and East.

If we try to analyze, for example, the agreements on friendship and cooperation which the USSR has signed with many East European states, it will be possible to see that some of the theses contained in them do not conform to present realities. This applies first and foremost to those clauses which may be interpreted in the spirit of the concept of “collective responsibility for the fate of socialism,” the notorious “Brezhnev doctrine,” as it is being referred to in the West. One can confidently state that, from the point of view of public interests, the European Economic Community is acquiring greater significance for West Europe than NATO. Apart from the fact that EEC is a more flexible organization, it has concluded a political cooperation agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CEMA], having left NATO far behind in this respect; NATO does not in fact maintain direct contacts with the Warsaw

Pact as a military organization of an opposing alliance (with the exception of negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons, negotiations which may only conditionally be classified as interbloc ones). Nevertheless, NATO is still playing a much more important role in the structure of West-West political relations than is the EEC.

The Helsinki accords undoubtedly have an enormous, moreover, a normative significance for East-West relations in Europe. It is precisely within their framework that that system of common values and that general understanding of the basic parameters of security, military sufficiency, disarmament, sovereignty, human rights, and a confidence is specified without which the common European home and new European order cannot emerge. However, the Helsinki process, being the main channel for the interaction between East and West, has in fact no institutional structures which would reflect this interaction. This is why today, in the era of new thinking, we have to speak about major repairs of the old bloc structures that have already fulfilled the work for which they were meant. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are not yet joining in the Helsinki process and, moreover, in the consciousness of politicians both in the east and the west, preference is siren to the bloc system. For example, the attempts to conduct negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces on the continent in the spirit of the Helsinki accords in the course of the CSCE Vienna conference have failed: The negotiations were turned over to the blocs in which both narrowly regional and narrowly departmental interests prevail in contrast to the broader European outlook which is gaining a foothold within the framework of CSCE.

It is, of course, necessary to be aware of the fact that we have only started creating a new European order and that the present situation is a transitional stage. Its specific features lie in the fact that the old structures, whose viability is undoubtedly decreasing, continue to exist, whereas new ones are only just emerging and are not always functioning effectively. This is true first and foremost for the internal situation in those East European countries in which political and economic reforms are presently under way. At times, the effect of the destabilizing factors there may intensify and social tension may increase. Any disease, before it recedes, reaches a crisis; this must be endured so that the source of the disease can be destroyed. This is particularly so, since already in the transitional period the socialist countries, which have embarked on the path of reforms, are encountering entirely new phenomena that seem to be unacceptable to many people raised on equalizing principles: inflation, budget deficit, unemployment, the play of market prices, social stratification, and so on. Each of these phenomena is a menace for a society which is undergoing a renewal. The inhomogeneity of East Europe and lack of synchrony in the processes which are going on there may also seriously complicate the situation on the continent. However, the only way out of these difficulties is to overcome them and not go backwards. Having passed through the agonizing process of

purification, Eastern Europe will become a more flourishing, democratic, and stable region and an organic part of a new European order.

The challenges of the transitional period also apply to international relations in Europe. The very fact of a coexistence of the new and old structures may create tension between them and give rise to political instability on the continent. It is therefore necessary to have a clear picture of whence threats to European stability may emerge during the transitional period in order to be able to neutralize them skillfully and in time. The following appear to be such sources of tension and instability:

- attempts of one side or another to use changes in East or West Europe and their often contradictory consequences for obtaining unilateral advantages;
- a breakdown or unsatisfactory course of negotiations on conventional or nuclear armaments and measures of confidence and possible violations of coordinated decisions by the sides;
- a breakthrough achieved by one side or another in the area of military technology and attempts to use it for putting pressure on the opponent and for violating the military balance in Europe;
- failure or slowing down of perestroika in the Soviet Union, especially in the sphere of the economy, raising the standard of living, on interethnic relations;
- giving up the attempts to create a common (market) foundation for relations first within the countries of CEMA and then between East and West Europe;
- dissimilar levels of economic and political integration on the continent; a deepening of the economic and institutional gap between the integrating West and transforming East Europe;
- attempts to create a new European order without the United States and the USSR or without one of them;
- the process of military integration in West Europe, especially if it proceeds vertically (in the direction of building up military power) and not horizontally (unification of the existing military structures of states), which will lead to a increase in the significance of the military factor in European and international relations;
- attempts to resolve the German question on an entirely national basis, without taking into account the interests of other European states, the United States, and Canada.

These difficulties are not inevitable and they can be overcome on the basis of common interests. Today, the stability of the European situation under the conditions of rapid changes is that sensitive point at which interests of East and West and of the USSR and the United States converge.

The difficulties of the transitional period make preservation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact necessary during this time. However, the two blocs (although apparently the Warsaw Pact to a larger extent, due to the insufficient development of its political structures) are in need of a considerable perestroyka and first and foremost of creating a certain model for their interaction. It is certainly naive to believe that the blocs will rid themselves of power orientation in the near future, but its preservation need not prevent adjusting their cooperation, primarily with the purpose of lowering the general level of mutual threats.

At the same time, it is inappropriate to assess many of the processes which are under way in Europe today in terms of past criteria. Certainly, disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, will not yield the desired effect unless it is accompanied by constructing a new system of confidence and security. In this case the old threats and mistrust will inevitably give way to new ones. The two processes should, to all appearance, proceed in parallel: Disarmament will gradually be supplemented by interaction. At present, there exists a certain gap between them. This, however, is not a reason for halting disarmament but rather an occasion for speeding up the creation of new structures of security and interaction.

One can often hear the assertion that the USSR is too great and dynamic to be accommodated by any stable European system. Quite obviously, there is some truth in it. However, at least four considerations must be taken into account here. First, in its spiritual and cultural heritage, the Soviet Union (Russia) is a European country. It might be useful to recall that during significant turningpoints in Russian (Soviet) history it always gravitated toward Europe and that its fate is connected with that of Europe. Second, we must take into account the trends of development of the international situation. For decades, the USSR has been looked upon in West Europe first and foremost as a powerful military adversary. However, the present development objectively leads to a decrease in significance of the military and, in the future, also of the nuclear factor in the international relations. In the economic as well as the scientific and technological aspects, however, the integrating West Europe is comparable to the Soviet Union. Third, a united Europe created without the participation of the USSR will in all probability be perceived by the latter as a structure directed against it; the Soviet Union will also be perceived by it as an external and hostile force. This is why the nonparticipation of the USSR in the new European order may have a more destabilizing effect than its participation in it. Fourth, the Soviet Union and other European countries are interdependent: Today, the main problems of the continent may hardly be resolved without Soviet participation.

It is quite obvious that the new order is not likely to be stable without an American presence either. West Europe will hardly go far enough toward the Soviet Union unless it feels a strong American support.

A common European home and political stability on the continent are not identical notions. However, one cannot exist without the other: A common European home may hardly be built on a shaky and unstable foundation and at the same time it is perfectly obvious that natural stability emerges on the basis of overcoming an unnatural situation—in the given case overcoming the split in Europe. The processes which are developing on the continent today are creating the only real chance for advancing toward this goal.

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